In a country where documenting truth has become a form of resistance, Oleksandr Pavlichenko stands at the center of Ukraine’s fight for accountability. As Executive Director of the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU), he leads one of the nation’s foremost efforts to record war crimes, defend rights, and uphold justice. Based in Kyiv, UHHRU unites a network of human rights organizations that carry forward the legacy of the 1976 Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

Since its founding in 2004, the union has provided free legal aid, pursued landmark cases in domestic courts and at the European Court of Human Rights, and monitored rights violations across the country. In the decade since Russia’s 2014 invasion—and especially after the 2022 escalation—UHHRU has documented thousands of abuses, supported victims, and pressed for reform in concert with international partners. Its network of public advice centers continues to offer legal guidance, issue reports, and train lawyers and activists to reinforce the rule of law even under siege.

In this conversation, Pavlichenko reflects on the painstaking process of documenting atrocities, the dilemmas of transitional justice, and the struggle to sustain legal aid as war stretches Ukraine’s institutions. He explains how UHHRU has verified nearly 90,000 entries in its “Tribunal for Putin” database, working closely with prosecutors and the International Criminal Court. Despite wartime pressures, Pavlichenko underscores UHHRU’s commitment to harmonizing Ukrainian law with the Rome Statute—anchored in verified evidence, international cooperation, and the enduring principle that human rights must place people first.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Thank you for taking the time to speak with me today. Since the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union co-founded the “Tribunal for Putin” (T4P) initiative, the database has recorded nearly 90,000 crimes as of March 25, 2025. What process ensures that each entry is verified and credible?

Oleksandr Pavlichenko: We currently have about 89,870 records. Some records are not included in the public database—specifically, cases supported by lawyers. That information is confidential and normally not presented publicly.

Regarding verification, our first approach uses OSINT (open-source intelligence) technologies and methodologies. We collect data from official sources. In several cases, our teams travel to areas such as Chernihiv, Kyiv, Sumy, and sometimes Kherson to verify the extent of damage caused by shelling, bombing, or other attacks.

The second method involves working directly with victims and witnesses. We conduct live interviews with witnesses or victims. Sometimes they approach one of the T4P initiative organizations—such as the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group—or others to request legal assistance.

We receive information from them and provide legal support, which helps us gather more details and legal context for specific cases. For example, today I communicated with the Office of the Prosecutor General and other law enforcement institutions. They often request information on specific cases or categories of crimes. We can provide them with details, practical examples, or facts that may not be available in their criminal proceedings.

We also organize cases by category—either by location (such as the Kherson or Chernihiv regions) or by type (such as material damage, casualties, injuries, or the destruction of specific buildings, such as medical or educational institutions).

This helps us reorganize and analyze verified information. Only verified data is included in the database; unverified information is excluded.

Jacobsen: How are cases prioritized to national prosecutors, including those handled by the ICC?

Pavlichenko: As I mentioned, we categorize the information, but there is no strict prioritization of cases. Usually, it depends on access to the territories. If we do not have access, we cannot conduct detailed documentation or include all materials in the database.

For example, in 2022, we worked on the case of Mariupol. Our public reception office remained there with two lawyers until March 16, gathering information and assisting residents. They were later evacuated. However, we do not have full access to all the information that could have been collected from Mariupol. Many traces were destroyed, and many witnesses and victims are no longer under Ukrainian jurisdiction.

Prioritization depends, first, on our available resources—because they are limited—and, second, on urgent tasks. For example, we received a call from territories near the front line reporting that Russian forces were hunting civilians with drones. This call came directly to our Kherson public reception office. We immediately relayed the information to colleagues at the United Nations, shared contacts, and ensured they had direct communication with local community leaders.

We then provided legal assistance to those affected and collected all related information. Based on that, we prepared a submission to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which helped prompt the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to prepare a report grounded in the data we collected. We also transferred those firsthand contacts to the UN team.

So, the prioritization often comes from ad hoc requests and urgent reports from the ground. Another form of prioritization occurs when we need to prepare specific submissions that will prompt international structures to respond to our ICC filings.

Our main task is to maintain the most complete possible database, with detailed, verified, and legally supported facts that can be used by law enforcement agencies or international partners when needed. This data also serves as an advocacy tool at the United Nations, the OSCE, and other institutions’ conferences and meetings. These verified facts are confirmed not only by us but also by our international partners.

We need to maintain this collaborative track with international partners, ensuring that the facts are legally substantiated and recognized.

Jacobsen: Your nationwide public advice centers continue to operate throughout Ukraine. Where is the demand the highest?

Pavlichenko: Since the pandemic, the specific location of each public reception office has become less critical. However, offices located near the front line—such as in Toretsk, Kramatorsk, and Kherson—have become far more important than, for example, those working primarily with internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Lviv or Rivne in the western regions.

We have qualified lawyers operating in all regions. Some specialize in IDP-related issues, while others focus on documentation and providing direct assistance to the most vulnerable groups of the local population. The scope of work varies from region to region.

At the same time, we are now in a difficult situation because U.S. funding was suspended, which forced us to reduce the activities of several public reception offices, especially in certain regions. We are trying to maintain operations and retain staff in the so-called “hot zones.” Still, it is incredibly challenging under the current circumstances, given the reduction in support from international donors. This remains one of the major challenges for our activities.

Jacobsen: UHHRU remains a leading advocate for transitional justice. At the March 24 conference, discussions centered on accountability, reparations, truth and memorialization, and guarantees of non-recurrence. What kind of commitment or action is now required from local governments—both by the end of this year and into 2026—to move that agenda forward?

Pavlichenko: The core need is not only verbal support but real, practical support for people living in occupied territories. We must seriously consider how to protect and, eventually, reintegrate those people. At the moment, no one can give a clear answer on how to deal with the population in occupied territories or how to prepare both occupation and post-occupation policies.

As I see it, the issue of transitional justice cannot be fully addressed before the end of the war. A national strategy on transitional justice has already been drafted, and we participated in its development. The text exists as a draft presidential decree, but it has not been promulgated or adopted. It was suspended as a special case under a special procedure.

Therefore, when speaking about transitional justice, the first requirement is the establishment of a coherent state policy, which currently does not exist. Once it is developed and adopted at the national level, it must then be implemented and adapted locally—especially in frontline and partially occupied regions such as Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk.

We must seriously consider how to address the legacy of occupation, because it is a heavy burden. For example, there are documents issued by the occupation authorities that are not recognized in Ukraine. Even certificates of birth and death must go through a judicial procedure to be reaffirmed by national courts.

And that concerns only two categories of documents. We are not even talking about the hundreds of thousands—indeed, millions—of other documents issued in occupied Crimea over more than 11 years, or in occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk, or in the newly occupied territories that have now been under Russian control for about three and a half years. These situations must be addressed systematically and incorporated into national legal procedures.

Another unresolved issue concerns collaboration—specifically, determining who should be punished for working under occupation, for example, in medical or educational institutions, and who should not. There is still no clear political message or legal guidance for these territories about how and when these issues will be resolved.

Jacobsen: You have flagged systemic shortfalls in payments to wounded servicemembers. Which enforcement levers would close the gap?

Pavlichenko: It is a serious and ongoing problem. It must be addressed and defended at the Ministry of Defense, which continues to support veterans and active servicemembers.

The issue lies in procedures and protocols. These must ensure that veterans, wounded soldiers, those killed in battle, and their families receive consistent and adequate support. Financial compensation mechanisms are relatively well developed, but the rehabilitation system—especially for severely wounded or disabled veterans—requires far greater attention.

Ideally, every wounded or returning servicemember should have a comprehensive support protocol that covers financial, psychological, medical, and social reintegration needs. For example, prisoners of war released from Russian detention are typically offered only about one month of rehabilitation, which is insufficient. In reality, their recovery requires sustained, long-term care and assistance.

The situation is gradually improving, thanks in part to greater involvement from international partners, who now pay much closer attention to this issue and provide targeted support.

However, the core challenge remains: the need for clear, binding protocols consistently applied by the Ministry of Defense. At times, the attitude or implementation by that institution has not met the necessary standards.

Jacobsen: UHHRU lawyers have documented Russia’s use of civilians as human shields, including abducted civilians. Which venues, whether Ukrainian courts, the ICC, or universal jurisdiction, are most likely to hold individuals accountable in these cases?

Pavlichenko: I can give a very brief answer to that question. I do not believe that international structures will handle these cases effectively, and I have little confidence in the usefulness of universal jurisdiction in this context.

I also doubt that the International Criminal Court (ICC) will be able to address this category of crimes specifically, though it might cite isolated examples. In reality, all such cases must be properly investigated and prosecuted within Ukraine’s national jurisdiction.

Whether this will have any tangible impact on Russia as punishment is another matter entirely; even now, there are very few cases where war criminals are physically present in court.

To give you a sense of scale: as of January 1, 2025, Ukraine had initiated around 183,000 criminal cases under Article 438 of the Criminal Code (war crimes, parts A and B). Yet, only 18 individuals have been sentenced in person; the rest have been tried in absentia. This means justice, in most cases, remains largely symbolic.

So, when we talk about justice and accountability, we must think practically about how to establish effective mechanisms to bring perpetrators physically before the courts.

Jacobsen: Since the ratification of the Rome Statute, what is UHHRU’s position on the parliamentary harmonization package and the Article 124 reservation?

Pavlichenko: Regarding Article 124, we publicly opposed Ukraine’s reservation. That reservation limits Ukraine’s acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdiction over certain crimes, and it has negatively affected the country’s international image by suggesting a partial withdrawal from full accountability under the Rome Statute.

As for harmonizing national legislation with international law, that work is still underway, including updates to several articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. However, I believe this effort comes too late to affect the current war. Harmonization will not improve the immediate situation in terms of investigating or prosecuting war crimes.

For example, even with these changes, we will not suddenly move from 18 in-person convictions to hundreds or thousands. It will not transform the current justice landscape. Therefore, while we support continued work on harmonization for the future, we must now focus on making the existing legal framework function more effectively in the present.

That remains our position.

Jacobsen: The 2024 national survey maps the growing needs of war-affected people. Which findings reshaped UHHRU programming?

Pavlichenko: The survey was based on responses from people living in both occupied and non-occupied territories. Our organization’s work focused on addressing the consequences of severe human rights violations explicitly committed in the occupied areas.

A special program on transitional justice was developed for implementation in 2025, reflecting the survey’s findings. However, as I mentioned earlier, we face significant challenges in sustaining our core activities—especially in providing legal assistance, which remains central to our mission.

Our ongoing priorities include analyzing current legislation, preparing draft proposals for new laws, and ensuring that these reforms adequately protect the human rights of people living under occupation. This remains a key element of our long-term strategy and our vision for the state’s policy during wartime and beyond.

For us, the principle of “people first” is not merely a slogan—it is the cornerstone of our programming. The survey findings reinforced this by showing a clear public demand to integrate the human dimension into national policy. Unfortunately, that dimension is not always fully considered in governmental decision-making.

Jacobsen: Oleksandr, thank you very much for your time and for sharing these insights today.