Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s national police have been compelled to rethink the very foundations of civilian law enforcement. Policing that once centered on routine public order and criminal investigation now unfolds amid missile strikes, drone warfare, cyber disruption, and prolonged infrastructure collapse. In this environment, the police operate at the uneasy intersection of emergency response, national defense, and public trust.

In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen speaks with Yuliia Vitasivna Hirdvilis, Head of Communications at Ukraine’s National Police, about how these adaptations function in practice. She explains new protocols designed to protect first responders from so-called “double-tap” strikes, the evolution of frontline evacuation units known as the “White Angels,” the expanding demands of explosive-ordnance clearance, and the growing importance of cyber coordination. The conversation also examines how policing reforms tied to European integration continue to advance during wartime—and what it takes to keep personnel effective under relentless physical and psychological strain.

This interview has been edited for clarity and length.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: “Double-tap” or follow-on strikes pose a serious risk to civilians and first responders. What operational changes has the national police introduced to reduce casualties at impact sites?

Yuliia Hirdvilis: The national police have introduced a clearly defined operational algorithm that regulates coordination between territorial duty officers and the central police command during periods of heightened threat. This system is designed to ensure continuous communication and the exchange of information on the risk of repeated artillery, missile, drone, or rocket attacks.

In practice, this means that police patrols and other responders working at the site of an initial strike receive immediate warnings if there is credible information about a possible follow-on attack. When such a threat is identified, officers and service vehicles are promptly withdrawn to designated safe locations. These measures are intended to reduce casualties among first responders while preserving the ability to resume response operations as soon as conditions allow.

Jacobsen: How do police evacuation teams prioritize rescues from frontline settlements under constant FPV-drone and artillery threat?

Hirdvilis: Evacuation operations in frontline areas are conducted in accordance with established police algorithms, but are always guided by an assessment of the current threat environment. This assessment is based on intelligence data, the intensity and frequency of shelling, the types of weapons used, and the likelihood of repeated attacks.

Priority is given to the most vulnerable groups: people with disabilities or limited mobility, elderly residents who cannot react quickly to danger, families with children, and civilians located in buildings or areas that have suffered critical destruction or remain under constant threat. At the same time, even the most carefully prepared plans must remain flexible. Conditions in frontline territories can change within minutes, requiring evacuation teams to adjust routes and priorities based on road damage, weather, available safe corridors, and the feasibility of rapid transport.

Police officers often carry out these missions under direct fire. Service vehicles have been damaged by shell fragments and FPV-drone strikes, underscoring the risks involved. The history of the “White Angels” evacuation teams reflects this reality. The first crew was formed in the town of Marinka in the Donetsk region, when police officers went beyond their formal duties to rescue civilians who had lost hope of receiving help.

Today, the White Angels consist of 24 mobile groups operating in the most dangerous regions of Ukraine. Over three years, they have carried out 9,775 deployments and evacuated 27,702 civilians, including 7,337 children. In addition, they have provided first aid to hundreds of victims, transported the wounded and seriously ill to hospitals, and recovered the bodies of the dead so that families could say farewell to their loved ones.

Jacobsen: With mine and unexploded-ordnance clearance likely to take decades, how is the national police preparing staff through IMAS-standard training and equipment?

Hirdvilis: Police explosive-ordnance disposal units play an essential role in protecting civilians and supporting national security. They are actively involved in operational demining and clearance activities across multiple regions, including Donetsk, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Chernihiv.

To date, these units have completed more than 29,000 service deployments, inspected over 15,000 hectares of territory, seized more than 153,000 explosive objects and 4,270 tonnes of explosives, and destroyed approximately 94,000 explosive items. This work remains ongoing and will continue for many years.

Since the beginning of 2022, international technical-assistance programs have helped strengthen these capabilities. In particular, the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, working through the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, has supported specialized training for 139 police officers from special-purpose units. At the same time, the need for additional equipment, modern tools, and initiation devices remains a significant challenge for explosive-ordnance units.

Jacobsen: CERT-UA reports persistent and diverse cyber incidents. What protocols allow for rapid evidence collection, disruption, and public warning?

Hirdvilis: To prevent and respond effectively to cyber incidents, Ukraine relies on standardized information-sharing rules based on the Traffic Light Protocol, which has been approved by the National Coordination Centre for Cybersecurity. These rules are aligned with guidance from the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity and international incident-response standards.

A unified interagency procedure defines each stage of cyber-incident response, including detection, analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery. It also requires immediate notification to CERT-UA and enables the rapid exchange of indicators of compromise among law enforcement, cybersecurity, and intelligence agencies.

Additional government resolutions govern the collection and preservation of electronic evidence and public warning mechanisms. Taken together, these frameworks ensure the rapid identification of cyber threats, the proper documentation of evidence, the containment of attacks, and timely public communication through official CERT-UA channels. Police cyber units also regularly publish guidance and recommendations to help citizens avoid becoming victims of cybercrime.

Jacobsen: Large-scale attacks on energy and gas facilities have become routine. How do police balance blackout-related public order, crime prevention, and site security?

Hirdvilis: Massive attacks on energy and gas infrastructure pose serious challenges to the state’s overall security system. In response, the police operate under reinforced and well-tested procedures during periods of widespread power outages.

Responsibilities are clearly distributed among police units, and coordination scenarios are regularly practiced with the State Emergency Service, medical responders, military administrations, and both patrol and criminal police. During power outages, police not only secure critical facilities but also increase patrols in areas most vulnerable to criminal activity. Patrol routes and staffing levels are adjusted to maintain public order, prevent offences, and ensure the stable functioning of key state facilities.

Jacobsen: Policing reforms featured prominently in the European Commission’s 2025 enlargement package. Which priorities matter most for the National Police now?

Hirdvilis: European integration remains a strategic priority for the National Police. Current efforts focus on implementing transparent, merit-based procedures for selecting leaders at both the central and regional levels, aligned with European standards.

Additional priorities include implementing a comprehensive action plan to combat organized crime based on Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessments, approving a new strategy for the 2026–2030 period, strengthening institutional and operational capacity through interagency cooperation, and appointing a permanent national coordinator for organized-crime policy.

Jacobsen: Sustaining frontline effectiveness requires managing fatigue and casualty risk. How is the police addressing these pressures?

Hirdvilis: The full-scale invasion has fundamentally altered the security environment and, with it, the work of the police. These changes have affected public expectations, technological requirements, and human-resources policy. Particular attention is being paid to staffing and supporting special-purpose and rapid-response units, including operational assault brigades and patrol battalions.

At the same time, the police remain a civilian institution governed by law. During martial law, police units operate strictly within their legal mandate to support national defense, territorial defense, and public order. Investigative units have opened more than 183,000 criminal proceedings related to crimes committed in connection with the armed conflict, with documented damages exceeding $2 billion.

Despite extraordinary conditions, the National Police continue to adapt—legally, operationally, and institutionally—to protect civilians, uphold the rule of law, and maintain accountability.

Jacobsen: Thank you for your time and insights.

Special thanks to the Communications Department of the National Police of Ukraine for facilitating this interview.