U.S. officials claimed that President Donald Trump’s reversal of plans announced in 2024 to send troops and long-range missiles to Germany was intended to avoid provoking Russian retaliation. The more likely explanation is far more practical: Europe is no longer a strategic priority for the White House, and the U.S. military needs those high-end defensive and offensive systems for its own operations after the war with Iran depleted American stockpiles.

In March, only days after the launch of Operation Epic Fury, EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius warned, “We cannot live with empty hopes that Americans will always be able to provide us with what is needed for our defense. A historical tectonic shift is starting to happen: Europeans are on their way to independence. At least, they are starting to understand that this is unavoidable.”

Europe’s challenge now is to become combat-ready and strategically self-sufficient, not only in operational capability but also across the defense industrial base—from design, source code, and manufacturing to supply chains and sovereign control over critical technologies. Although Trump’s decision unsettled many European leaders, it has also created an opportunity for Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own security. The question is whether EU member states can finally prioritize capability over national industrial rivalries.

Pursuing the Shield and the Sword

Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz once observed that “the defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows.” An effective European defense against a potential Russian attack therefore requires both a credible shield capable of protecting the continent and a powerful sword able to deliver those “well-directed blows.” European governments increasingly recognize this reality, even if cooperation has not always been straightforward.

Efforts to build Europe’s defensive shield have included national investments in air defense alongside the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), whose objective is to coordinate procurement among participating countries, reduce costs, and improve interoperability. Yet the initiative has made only limited progress and has attracted significant criticism because it largely reflects Germany’s own procurement decisions.

ESSI relies on three principal systems: the American Patriot, whose batteries and interceptors are currently in short supply and remain subject to U.S. political approval; the Israeli-American Arrow-3, which still lacks interoperability with NATO’s ballistic missile defense architecture despite plans to acquire the forthcoming Arrow-4; and Germany’s domestically produced IRIS-T short-range air defense system developed by Diehl Defence.

Critics argue that this approach leaves Europe’s defensive architecture overly dependent on foreign suppliers while sidelining important components of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), particularly the Franco-Italian SAMP/T system and its Aster interceptors, produced by the Eurosam consortium of MBDA and Thales.

Recognizing the need to strengthen European industrial cooperation, France’s former Minister of Defense Sébastien Lecornu met with his Italian counterpart, Guido Crosetto, in Corsica in 2024, where they signed a letter of intent encouraging MBDA to increase production of Aster missiles. Lecornu described the Franco-Italian-German-British missile manufacturer as “a model of cooperation that does not compromise our sovereignty. Each country retains its full capabilities and, of course, control over its respective subsidiary.”

MBDA has since expanded that cooperative model. In March, the company’s British subsidiary announced a partnership with Poland’s PGZ to produce CAMM-ER medium-range air defense missiles locally, extending European industrial collaboration beyond its traditional partners.

These bilateral initiatives have successfully brought European-made systems into service. More ambitious and technologically demanding programs, however, are increasingly being coordinated at the EU level through the European Defence Fund (EDF).

One such effort addresses the challenge posed by hypersonic missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), against which neither Europe nor the United States currently possesses air defense systems capable of providing reliable interception.

To meet this challenge, the EDF funded the HYDEF project in 2022. Led by Spain’s SMS consortium, with Germany’s Diehl responsible for the technical architecture, the project also includes participation from Belgium, Norway, and Poland. The proposed interceptor is based on Diehl’s IRIS-T technology. A year later, the EDF announced funding for a second initiative, HYDIS. Coordinated by France’s MBDA, HYDIS brings together national subsidiaries, industrial partners, and research organizations from 14 countries, with formal participation from France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.

Both projects aim to field an operational capability by 2035. The EDF justified financing two competing programs as a way to encourage innovation and improve the chances of success, although only one project will ultimately receive full EU backing when the selection is made in 2026. The advantage of direct involvement from Brussels is that, unlike many previous multinational efforts, there is at least a defined timetable for reaching a decision on Europe’s future defensive shield.

Attention is now turning to Europe’s offensive capabilities—the “sword.” Here, progress has been slower.

In 2024, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom launched the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA), an initiative to develop a deep-precision strike missile with a range exceeding 1,000 kilometers. For nearly two years, however, the program struggled to gain momentum. Participating governments could not agree on operational requirements, while national industries remained focused on promoting their own domestic champions.

Trump’s recent decision may have injected new urgency into the project. On June 18, participating governments announced the creation of eight ELSA Implementation Groups (EIGs), each to be led, financed, and managed by an individual country, although specific national responsibilities have yet to be assigned.

Three of the eight groups will focus on ground-launched strike systems with ranges of 300–500 kilometers, 500–2,000 kilometers, and more than 2,000 kilometers. Another group will oversee the development of an air-launched long-range strike capability.

From the outset, ELSA has embraced what participants describe as a “best athletes” approach, selecting industrial leaders based on the operational effectiveness of their proposals and their ability to deliver capabilities quickly rather than on political considerations alone.

Several ongoing European programs could emerge as leading candidates. MBDA Deutschland and Sweden’s Saab are jointly developing the air-launched Taurus NEO, an upgraded version of the existing Taurus cruise missile with significantly greater range. Germany’s Bundestag approved a €450 million production contract last December, and the missile is expected to enter service in 2029.

MBDA France also announced at the Eurosatory 2026 exhibition that its ground-launched Land Cruise Missile (LCM), with a range exceeding 1,000 kilometers, is expected to be operational by 2029. The company has emphasized that the program remains “open to European cooperation.” Germany and the United Kingdom have likewise announced plans to jointly develop stealthy hypersonic cruise missiles capable of striking targets more than 2,000 kilometers away.

Even so, ELSA has so far demonstrated that multinational cooperation has not necessarily delivered capabilities any faster than projects coordinated directly through EU institutions.

Coordinating Cooperation

In 2024, Anne Fort, then a senior adviser to Andrius Kubilius, observed that “The European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) is capable of supplying high-end products and is competitive, but it suffers from uncoordinated investments.” Two years later, that assessment remains largely accurate.

America’s gradual strategic withdrawal from Europe therefore represents both a challenge and an opportunity. The continent can no longer assume that Washington will indefinitely underwrite its security, yet the shift also gives European governments a powerful incentive to strengthen their own industrial base and strategic sovereignty.

If Europe is to respond effectively to an increasingly volatile security environment, cooperation must move beyond long-standing industrial rivalries and national procurement preferences. The priority should be closing the continent’s most pressing capability gaps while accelerating the delivery of systems that can realistically deter or defeat a potential Russian attack.

The coming months should reveal whether European leaders are prepared to match their rhetoric with action. National initiatives such as ELSA, alongside EU-backed programs including HYDEF and HYDIS, will test whether governments are finally willing to select projects based not on national prestige but on operational effectiveness, industrial sustainability, and genuine logistical and strategic sovereignty.